Financial crisis, international portfolio diversification, income smoothing
We examine the impact of the global financial crisis on the degree of international income and consumption risk-sharing among industrial economies using returns on cross-border portfolio holdings (e.g., debt, equity, FDI). We split the returns from the net foreign holdings as receipts (inflows) and payments (outflows) to investigate which of the two sides exhibited the greater resilience for income risk-sharing during the recent crisis. First, we find that debt delivered better risk-sharing than equity, mainly reflecting the deficit deterioration in EMU countries during the post-crisis period. FDI, by contrast, did not correspond to noticeable risk diversification. Second, separating output shocks into positive and negative components reveals that debt holding receipts (equity liability payments) performed better under negative (positive) realizations of the shock variable. Third, the unwinding of capital flows resulted in a sharp fall in income dis-smoothing via the debt liability channel in the new EU countries.
Introduction
The financial crisis and global recession of 2008-2009 was associated with a significant deterioration in economic activity across developed economies. In particular, the crisis has put significant pressure on public finance in several mature economies. Between the end of 2007 and the end of 2010, average budget deficits in OECD countries increased from 1% to 8% of GDP (gross domestic product) and gross government debt rose from 73% to 97% of GDP. 1 This was the outcome of a multitude of factors including the great upheaval in the global financial markets, a general loss of confidence, a dramatic collapse in world international trade and hence a contraction in global output growth.
One particular aspect that played a central role in the ongoing world financial crisis was the deepening of financial globalization, which is typically measured by using a proxy consisting of the ratio of cross-border assets and liabilities (averaged) over GDP. 2 Although, from a historical perspective, financial globalization is not a new phenomenon, 3 the depth and breadth of globalization has been accelerated particularly by the formation of the European monetary union A growing body of empirical studies has documented that greater financial globalization leads to increased risk-sharing, at least, among industrial countries -see Kose et al. (2007) for a summary of findings of related papers. However, much of these findings are related to an era of financial upturn (fueled by the creation of the European monetary union, EMU), and does not provide a complete picture of the risk exposure during financial market downturn. Indeed, 1 See Davies and Ng (2001) for a graphical illustration. 2 See, among others, Lane and Milessi Ferreti (2007) for an empirical illustration based on this measure. We use the similar measure in this paper. For a list of alternative measures used in the literature see Schmukler (2004) .
3 Bordo et al. (1999) offer a detailed account of the characteristics of the wave of financial globalization before 1914 compared to today's.
"the impact in terms of diversification will be beneficial to the extent that globalization does not lead to an increase of the degree co-movement between international stock markets" (Beine et al., 2010, p. 184) . This is the so-called knife-edge property of the financial markets, whereby financial interconnections serve as a shock absorber (i.e., risk-sharing) within a certain range, but beyond the tipping point, interconnections serve as a shock amplifier (i.e., risk-spreading) -see Tasca and Battiston (2011) for further details. Recent research by Christoffersen et al. (2012) conclude that the benefits of international diversification across both developed and emerging markets have lessened because of a gradual increase in the average correlation of these markets.
Moreover, Beine et al. (2010) show that the ongoing globalization process has increased the probability that the two markets will crash simultaneously. Relatedly, Ibragimov et al. (2011) derive conditions under which it may be socially optimal to have financial intermediaries hold less diversified portfolios in order to have a lower probability of widespread collapse. These findings cast doubt on the desirability of international portfolio diversification, particularly during market downturn when investors need diversification benefits most (Vermeulen, 2011) .
Although it is still early to reach rock-solid conclusions whether to blame globalization for the severity of the ongoing global financial crisis, interestingly, the spread of the recent financial crisis from the US to other countries was itself an example of international risk-sharing. Indeed, as documented by Mendoza and Quadrini (2010) , the impact of the crisis on the US economy has been smaller because the crisis has been shared with other countries. Nonetheless, it was not an example of perfect risk-sharing, as some countries were heavily hit than others. On the other hand, the lack of a fiscal risk-sharing mechanism at the Euro area level has been identified as one of key factors behind the ongoing Eurozone's sovereign debt crisis (Allard, 2011) . The global financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009, therefore, marks an opportune time to revisit the issue of international risk-sharing.
In this paper, we study the impact of financial crisis on the degree of international risksharing for a set of industrial economies using annual data over the 1999-2009 period. We consider income-based risk-sharing based on gross national income (GNI), which is proxied by "income betas" estimated by the slope of per capita GNI to GDP growth, both taken as deviations from aggregate (or world) levels. We disaggregated the difference between GDP and GNI (i.e., net factor income flows) as the receipts and payments of the portfolio holdings (debt, equity, FDI) to examine (i) which forms of assets delivered better risk-sharing and (ii) whether liability payments provided risk-sharing differently from assets. These issues are evaluated further using a shock decomposition of GDP (positive versus negative aggregate shocks) to assess the relative contribution of the risk-sharing channels in light of the financial crisis. We also check the sensitivity of our analysis by estimating the contribution to consumption risk-sharing via factor income flows. In our analysis, the impact of the 2008-2009 financial crisis is captured by simply comparing the results between the 1999 and 1999 by data availability, we perform a similar analysis for the new EU countries and compare them vis-à-vis their EMU counterparts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical methodology.
Section 3 presents the data and empirical results. Section 4 documents risk-sharing among the group of new EU countries. Finally, Section 5 concludes. However, before summarizing the findings of our results, let us take a detour through the recent empirical literature on international risk-sharing.
Related literature
For brevity, in this sub-section, we summarize the findings of some recent empirical work related to this paper. Our paper is closely related to the category of studies that employ various regression models to measure the extent of risk-sharing and to examine the impact of financial flows on the degree of risk-sharing. Our empirical work has particular relevance for studies that routinely monitor the progress of financial integration in Europe (see, e.g., European Central Bank, 2011). Sørensen et al. (2007) propose a general framework to examine how financial integration facilitates international risk-sharing. Employing data over the period 1993-2003, they find that larger holdings of foreign assets are associated with better risk-sharing for countries in the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), while foreign liabilities did not yield any noticeable risk-sharing. Somewhat similar results were obtained by Demyanyk et al. (2008) , who extended the Sørensen et al. (2007) study using additional data (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) and more countries. They notice that the effect of diversification on risk-sharing is roughly similar for foreign assets and liabilities. Balli et al. (2011) , on the contrary, find that increased holdings of foreign assets caused income dis-smoothing during [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] , the years surrounding the introduction of the Euro. They interpret their result as a consequence of increased business cycle synchronization across EMU and EU countries. Bracke and Schmitz (2011 ), using annual data over 1970 -2005 for 35 industrial and emerging market economies, find that net capital gains behaved in the required countercyclical way (particularly since the mid-1990s) but for only the industrial countries, whereas emerging market economies did not seem to benefit from such risk-sharing. A similar result was obtained by Kose et al. (2009) . Employing annual data over the period 1960-2004 for a sample of 69 countries -21 industrial and 48 developing (of which 21 were emerging economies) -they find that only industrial countries had attained better risk-sharing outcomes during the recent period of globalization, whereas developing countries had, by and large, been shut out of this benefit. These findings suggest that financial globalization has, so far, led to asymmetric benefits globally.
Recently, Balli et al. (2012) examine risk-sharing through capital gains for EMU, EU and other OECD countries over the period 1992-2007. They find that risk-sharing from capital gains is higher than risk-sharing from factor income flows, whereas saving remains the most important source of overall international consumption risk-sharing in the Euro area.
Our main finding is that, for risk-sharing through cross-border investments, the factor income inflow channel (the sum of debt, equity and FDI holding receipts) was a better shock absorber than the factor income outflow channel (the sum of debt, equity and FDI liability payments) during the current financial crisis. In the aftermath of the crisis, receipts from debt securities resulted in a more potent channel of income risk-sharing than the receipts of equity securities. However, the increased risk-sharing through debt receipts itself was a by-product of the financial crisis, because to offset the decline in equities, industrial economies increased their debt issuance to stimulate domestic economy. Results are very similar when consumption risk-sharing is considered. Although FDI holdings did not correspond to noticeable income smoothing, it did support higher consumption smoothing in OECD countries in the run-up to the financial crisis. A decomposition of output shocks revealed that debt receipts (equity payments) performed better under negative (positive) output shocks. In the new EU countries, the unwinding of capital flows resulted in a sharp fall in income dis-smoothing via the debt payment liability channel, which appears to be consistent with the switching of their average external balance from deficit to surplus following the intensification of the global financial crisis.
Moreover, receipts from debt holdings played a less potent channel of risk-sharing in the new EU countries (compared to their EMU counterparts) under negative output shocks.
Methodology
One simple way to analyze income smoothing from internationally diversified portfolios is to look at the difference between a country's GNI and GDP over time. Consider the following identity
where A F is the stock of domestic assets owned by foreign residents, r F is the rate of return on these assets and A D and r D are domestically owned foreign assets and the return on those, respectively. The term r D A D − r F A F is widely known as the net factor income (NFI). If NFI is not perfectly correlated with GDP, the GNI of a country may be less variable than it would be in the absence of international assets, thus partially insulating income streams against the idiosyncratic fluctuations in GDP. Based on this reasoning, Sørensen et al. (2007) propose an empirical framework for testing the extent of international income smoothing using the following panel regression
where ∆ log GDP i t is the annual change in GDP per capita in constant prices minus the unionwide (or aggregate) counterpart (∆log GDP t ), ∆ log GNI i t is the annual change in GNI per capita in constant prices minus the aggregate counterpart (∆log GNI t ), and ν i,t and i,t are constant and error terms, respectively. Depending on the occasion, the aggregate variable corresponds either to OECD, EMU or EU member countries. The reason for removing aggregate output fluctuations from country fluctuations is to isolate the smoothable output fluctuations. The slope coefficient β f measures the average co-movement of a country's idiosyncratic GNI growth (i.e., the deviation from aggregate/union-wide GNI growth) with idiosyncratic GDP growth in year t. The lower the β f , the higher the income risk-sharing and vice versa. Therefore, the scalar 1 − β f measures the amount of income smoothing via net factor income flows. The metric 1 − β f will take the value 1 if risk-sharing is perfect and the value zero if GNI moves one-to-one with GDP.
A decomposition of income smoothing via net factor income
Following Balli et al. (2011) , we decompose income smoothing via the NFI channel into factor income inflows and factor income outflows using following regression specification
∆ log
where GDPIN = GDP + FACTOR INCOME INFLOW and GDPOUT = GDP − FACTOR INCOME OUTFLOW.
Adding these two equations together yields the following equation
where
is the coefficient of income smoothing via the factor income inflows (outflows) channel.
As NFI in OECD countries is dominated by net revenues from financial assets held abroad,
we proceed to disaggregate the NFI into its subcomponents, namely receipts and payments of interest, dividends and retained earnings. 4 To observe the extent of risk-sharing arising from the revenue of these components, we also decompose the NFI into the receipts of interests, dividends and FDI retained earnings from foreign assets as well as payments of interest, dividends and FDI retained earnings to foreign liabilities. Algebraically, NFI is formulated as
In order to quantify the amount of risk-sharing from each of the subcomponents, we make use of the following regression specification
where X corresponds to the receipts (payments) of bond, equity and FDI assets (liabilities). For example, to examine the degree of income smoothing via interest revenue from bond holdings (i.e., INTEREST RECEIPTS) we estimate
where ∆ log (GDP + INTEREST RECEIPTS) i t is the annual change in GDP plus interest receipts per capita in constant prices minus the union-wide counterpart, ∆log(GDP + INTEREST RECEIPTS) t , and likewise for the other components.
We end the discussion of this section by briefly outlining the econometric methodology employed throughout the paper. To account for autocorrelation in the residuals, we assume that the error terms in each equation/country follow an AR(1) process. Due to the short sample period, we restrict the autocorrelation parameter to be identical across countries/equations. We allow for country-specific variances of the error terms. Following Sørensen and Yosha (1998) , the estimation is carried out using a two-step generalized least squares (GLS) procedure: (i) the entire panel is estimated using ordinary least squares (which is equivalent to a seemingly unrelated regression type estimation since the model contains identical regressors) and (ii) residuals from the first step is used to estimate variance for each country and corrected for heteroscedasticity. Unless stated otherwise, we use differenced data at a yearly frequency.
3 Empirical results
Data and descriptive statistics
We use a dataset for 22 industrial countries with annual data between 1999 and 2009, surrounding the year of the introduction of the Euro. Country selection is essentially driven by data quality and consistency requirement. The sample is divided into several country groups: EMU, EU, new EU and OECD countries -see Table 1 for the complete country list. Our country selection and data coverage are comparable to those of Sørensen et al. (2007) , Demyanyk et al. (2008) and Balli et al. (2011) . Per capita figures are obtained by normalizing over the population of each country. All series are expressed in real per capita terms. Major variables such as GDP, GNI, factor income inflows and outflows, population and consumer price indices were taken from OECD National Accounts database (volume I). Disaggregated NFI flows, i.e., interest receipts (payments), dividend receipts (payments) and retained earnings (payments) on FDI were obtained from OECD National Accounts detailed tables (Volume II). In particular, equity receipts (payments) were reported in OECD dataset as the distributed income of corporations which predominantly include dividends received (paid) from (to) foreign equity investments, while debt receipts (payments) simply reflect the interest obtained (paid) on foreign debt holdings. 5 The FDI retained earnings receipts (payments) reflect the distributed income of FDI. The average annual growth rates of most receipt and payment items are relatively larger in size among EMU countries (despite having slightly higher variability) than in the overall OECD aggregate, which would support portfolio flows as a potentially more important channel for the Euro area countries. In both EMU and OECD countries, the return on debt instruments was higher that those of equity and FDI portfolios (as ratios of GDP). This picture is line with the rapid growth of leverage -enabled by the globalization of banking and a period of unusually low interest rates and risk spreads -after 2000 in most mature economies. 6 Among the new EU countries, the larger payment of debt liabilities compared to receipts from debt assets (as ratios of GDP) also appear consistent with their net debtor position, fueled by reduced borrowing costs and the improved creditworthiness, of these economies. 7
Income smoothing
How have factor income flows contributed to international risk-sharing in developed economies over the past decade? Did factor income inflows or factor income outflows contribute more to income smoothing? How did the recent global economic and financial crises affect these international risk-sharing channels? A quantitative assessment of these questions is presented in Table 2 . Answers to the first question -for which we are able to get a historical pictureis presented in the topmost row in panels A and B, respectively, for EMU and OECD countries.
Overall, the results paint a mixed picture for both groups of countries. If we focus on the first three sub-periods (1971-80; 1981-90; 1991-00) , we find that NFI flows caused income dis-smoothing in OECD countries (indicated by the negative 1 − β f coefficient), whereas the impact was more favorable for the EMU countries. One likely interpretation of this difference in results is due to increased home bias in bonds and equity in some non-EMU OECD countries (e.g., Japan, the United States) compared to their EMU counterparts. 8 Since 2000, the contribution of NFI flows to income smoothing has been higher and statistically significant for both groups of nations. However, the asymmetric impact of the global financial crisis on NFI flows in relation to risk-sharing is a key focus of this paper. We find that relative to the 2001-2007 period, during [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] , EMU countries experienced a slight decline in income smoothing via the NFI flows, while the OECD countries as a whole registered a modest increase in income smoothing. Clearly, the non-EMU OECD member nations -including the resource-rich economies of Australia, Canada and Norway -showed stronger resilience than EMU countries during the global financial crisis that has seriously disrupted capital movements around the world.
Turning to the second and third questions posed above, we find that factor income inflows coefficients are obtained after smoothing the time-variation using a Normal kernel with a bandwidth (standard deviation) of 2. As can be seen, the trends described above are clearly visible.
Overall, holdings of both assets and liabilities mattered in international income risk-sharing during the recent global economic crisis. Returns on assets (factor income inflows) provided the needed buffer against output shocks in EMU countries, while liability payments (factor income outflows) helped the non-EU OECD countries to insulate themselves partially from residual output shocks. These effects were, however, far from perfect risk-sharing, as is evident from the rather smaller coefficients of factor income flows.
The contribution of bonds, equity and FDI
What class of assets underlies the international income risk-sharing documented above? In this section, we provide the relative contribution of the receipts and payments of the bonds (and bank loans), equity and FDI in the international risk-sharing process in OECD countries. We continue to focus on the 1999-2009 period (relative to 1999-2007) to find out the effect of the global financial crisis on international risk-sharing. Table 3 reports the detailed results of each asset category in terms of its receipts, payments and net position. A quick glance at Table 3 Finally, the lower panel in Table 3 shows that FDI did not correspond to noticeable risk diversification over recent years. Although some evidence of income smoothing via FDI liability was observed in EMU countries during the pre-crisis period, the effect was not statistically significant. Employing a broader sample of mature and emerging market economies but using pre-crisis data, Fratzscher and Imbs (2009) behind the low risk-sharing. However, these costs are likely to be particularly worrisome in countries with poor institutional quality and which are closed to international markets, but less so in mature economies as considered in the present analysis. In summary, the precise magnitude of the gains from FDI holdings remains an open question.
Income smoothing under asymmetric output shocks
The preceding discussion made no allowance for the distinction between positive and negative output shocks, an omission that could bias the coefficients attached to output, thereby leading to a misinterpretation of the results. For example, when a country is on a positive growth path, it is likely to face more permanent positive shocks compared to negative ones, causing the absolute value of the coefficient attached to positive shocks to inflate. If the economy is fairly well insured against negative shocks, not distinguishing positive shocks from negative shocks might result in lack of recognition of these insurance capabilities (Pierucci and Ventura, 2010) .
To guard against this possibility, following Pierucci and Ventura (2010), we augment Equation (6) by explicitly distinguishing between the "positive" and "negative" realizations of the GDP shock variable
where GDP + it and GDP − it are the positive and negative output shocks, respectively. Shock decomposition for other components (equity and FDI) are derived in a similar fashion. We use an output gap process to distinguish between positive and negative realizations of the GDP.
Assuming that trend output is the level of output that a country wishes to secure, the negative GDP component is defined as those that correspond to periods with a negative output gap (actual GDP minus trend GDP), and positive GDP components are those corresponding to periods with a positive output gap. 14 This shock decomposition will allow us to capture favourable or unfavourable shocks even when ∆ log GDP it is positive at all times, which is generally the case under normal circumstances. provided countries the ability to cushion the effects of negative and positive output shocks. For example, about 26% of negative income shocks are smoothed by interest received on debt assets in EMU countries, compared with 15% of adverse shocks in the OECD. The magnitude of income smoothing from equity returns is also much higher in EMU (25%) than OECD (5%) when they are hit by a positive shock. As stock market returns generally reflect the country-specific performance of of listed firms, equity returns tend to be positively correlated with the output of the issuing country, which help explains why equity returns provided the buffer when a country's output was hit by a positive shock. In contrast, when a country is hit by a negative shock, its ability to raise fund through stock market diminishes amid weakening growth prospect. As the recent experience of the several peripheral EMU countries show, during economic downturns countries increasingly rely on new sovereign debt issuances -albeit at higher marginal costmainly to meet the debt service on the existing stock. Overall, the estimates are somewhat noisy due to the small sample size and to the possible noise in the measurement of output gap.
The results, however, offer a tentative picture about the way countries respond to asymmetric economic shocks.
Consumption smoothing
Although consumption risk sharing is essentially determined by income risk sharing and by patterns of saving; in practice, households care more about smoothing their consumption than income. In this section we quantify the impact of factor income flows on consumption risk sharing in both OECD and EMU countries. The estimation strategy is similar to that of the income smoothing model discussed above. The panel regression equation is specified as
where ∆ log (C) i t is the difference between country i's per capita final consumption and aggregate per capita final consumption for the group at time t; ∆ log (GDP) i t is defined as above; υ is a constant and + i,t are error terms. The coefficient β c measures the average co-movement of a country's idiosyncratic consumption growth with its idiosyncratic GDP growth in year t.
The lower the co-movement, the higher amount of consumption is buffered against GDP fluctuations, therefore a lower β c is expected such that the metric 1 − β c measures 'total consumption smoothing.'
In a similar manner, we quantify the effect of the 'factor income inflows' vs. 'factor income outflows' on consumption smoothing using the following regression specification
and ∆ log (C + FACTOR INCOME OUTFLOW) i
where the coefficient β + c (β − c ) measures the average co-movement of a country's idiosyncratic consumption with factor income inflow (outflow) growth with respect to its idiosyncratic GDP growth in period t; whereas the metric 1−β + c (1−β − c ) measures the amount of total consumption smoothing via factor income inflows (outflows). Table 5 reports the estimation results corresponding to Equations (8)- (10). A first remark is that compared with the extent of income smoothing (see Table 2 ) the magnitude of consumption smoothing is higher since the latter entails all likely sources of risk-sharing including income, government consumption, precautionary saving, credit rationing and developments in the housing market (see Demyanyk et al., 2008 , for further discussion). Second, despite the fluctuations, the citizens of the EMU and OECD countries were able to maintain a surprisingly comparable level of consumption smoothing over the past four decades. In fact, the financial crisis contributed to only a slight drop in consumption risk-sharing in EMU and OECD, which can be seen by comparing the estimated parameters (1 − β c ) in the last two columns in Table   5 . Further, while factor income outflows (external liabilities) contributed to a 4% increase in consumption smoothing in both regions; factor income inflows (external assets) instead lowered consumption smoothing in EMU countries by 2%. Although the estimates are somewhat noisy due to short samples, there is little doubt that until 2009 the global financial crisis has affected the factor income channel of consumption risk-sharing considerably.
As above, we are able to examine the impact of different asset classes (bonds, equity, FDI) on consumption risk-sharing achieved through factor income flows. This estimation is conducted using the regression model similar to Equation (5) ∆ log (C − X) i t = υ c + β
where X corresponds to the receipts (payments) of bond, equity and FDI assets (liabilities) and are modelled using the same procedure as in Equation (6). 15 Results are presented in Table 6 . The estimated coefficients in the first row of Table 6 which are obtained by regressing a country's consumption level on its output -are interpreted as the amount of unsmoothed shocks and is seen to have widened more in EMU than OECD in the run-up to the financial crisis. The estimated coefficients of the remaining sub-channels can be interpreted as follows. Recall that, in each sub-channels the dependent variable is obtained by subtracting the receipts (or adding payments) component from consumption and then regressing the transformed item on output, see Equation (11). Hence, for example, an increase in the estimated coefficient in these regressions (relative to that shown in the first row, C) imply a higher correlation between consumption and output, and is therefore interpreted as an increase in consumption risk-sharing. Consistent with the findings above, we find that in both regions interest receipts on debt assets provided a significant amount of consumption smoothing in the run-up to the financial crisis. By contrast, interest payments on debt liabilities resulted in a drop in consumption smoothing by a higher amount in EMU compared with OECD.
The net positive impact on consumption risk-sharing from debt assets is thus higher in OECD than EMU. On the other hand, the net contribution from dividend receipts on equity assets in buffering shocks to consumption is identical (6%) in EMU and OECD, where the positive risksharing stemmed from returns on equity liabilities than returns on equity assets. Finally, the most highlighted aspect of FDI-supported consumption smoothing is present in OECD countries during the 1999-2009 sample originating from payments to FDI retained earnings.
New EU members
The preceding analysis has focused upon the core EMU member countries. The recent enlargement of the European Union by 11 countries mostly Central and Eastern European (CCE) countries (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia) heralds the enlargement of the EMU. Although some CCE countries are still outside the union, the new member states are obliged to join the EMU as soon as they fulfill the Maastricht criteria for monetary, fiscal and exchange rate convergence (Grauwe and Schnabl, 2011) . One key aspect of the increased financial integration between old and new EU members has been the large capital inflows from older to newer economies. 16 During the pre-crisis boom years, large foreign capital inflows into the CCE region not only contributed to a rapid catching-up in many countries, they also led to the build-up of imbalances and variabilities (European Commission, 2011, p. 4) . Although, unlike the core EMU and OECD countries, detailed information on the composition of factor income flows are not available for the new EU member countries, we were able to obtain aggregate data for receipts on financial assets (including interest receipts, dividend receipts and FDI retained earnings), payments on financial liabilities (including interest payments, dividend payments and FDI retained earning payments) and the sum of net compensation of employees. Table 7 presents a comparative picture of the new and old EU countries in relation to the various channels of international risk-sharing on the spread of the financial crisis, as captured by comparing results between 1999-2007 and 1999-2009 . For the CCE region, we find no change in the contribution of net factor income flows (1 − β f ) to income smoothing following the financial crisis, which is rather unsatisfactory when compared to the core EMU countries, who experienced an increase in risk-sharing in times of economic hardship. While receipts on financial assets contributed to a 1% increase in risk-sharing in the new EU countries during the crisis period, this gain is barely comparable with the significant large gain achieved by core EMU countries over the same period. In addition to the size difference (see Table 1 ), these differing results may have been created by differences in the quality of asset holdings in the two groups of countries.
In the CCE region, payments on financial liabilities caused income dis-smoothing, although the effect seemed to have largely dissipated following the financial crisis compared to the pre-crisis samples (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . The negative smoothing can be interpreted in light of evidence that in the CCE region, a large part of investment financed by capital inflows was directed towards the non-tradable sector, implying a lower contribution to productivity growth and prospective export potential (Jevčák et al., 2010) . However, the fall in the amount of dis-smoothing on the Table 7 shows that compensation of employees caused income dis-smoothing for both old and new EU countries. This result is probably driven by the pro-cyclicality between output and labor income in new EU countries, which is not surprising, given the higher business cycle synchronization documented between old and new EU countries in recent years. For instance, Savva et al. (2010) find that both new and old EU countries experienced a sizable increase in their business cycle synchronization with the Euro area. Moreover, for some new EU members, the business cycle correlations have changed from negative and small to positive correlations. Comparable results have been found by Darvas and Szapáry (2008) , Afonso and Furceri (2007) , Kutan and Yigit (2004) and Artis et al. (2004) .
Finally, Table 8 presents how each of the international risk-sharing channels fared under asymmetric output shocks. Focusing on the negative output shocks (∆GDP − ), which characterize the current financial crisis, we see that while contribution from financial assets (i.e., interest receivable, dividend receipts and FDI receipts) and debt liabilities (i.e., interest payable, dividend payments and FDI payments) towards income smoothing has marginally declined in the new EU nations, it has noticeably increased in the old EU countries. As suggested above, for the new EU countries, this decline is in line with the substantial capital outflows documented following 17 Further details are available in Jevčák et al., (2010) . 18 We use net figures, which are adjusted for all remittance outflows from the CCE region.
the financial crisis. However, in the wake of the financial crisis, many core EMU countries issued substantial debt to stabilize the sharply contracting European economy. Following the experience of sizable debt reduction during 1999-2007, the government debt-to-GDP ratio in the Euro area as a whole exceeded the 60% reference value (see Lojsch et al., 2011) . Even after controlling for the lower nominal GDP growth -which is the denominator in the debt-to-GDP ratio -the increase in the Euro area's debt ratio reflects how debt deterioration during the period 2008-2010 was due to adopting sizable fiscal stimulus measures. Such countercyclical fiscal policies in the Euro area, which have led to an increased supply of sovereign debt, helped them to address the impact of the financial crisis, at least partially. Interestingly, the estimates of the 'income from net financial assets' before and after the financial crisis remain unchanged in both groups of EU countries. Lastly, the contribution from net compensation of employees played a more favorable role in the new EU nations than in the old members.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the extent to which the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 has affected international income risk-sharing across a set of industrial economies comprised of EMU, EU and other OECD countries. Rather than focusing solely on the returns of the cross-border portfolios, we split portfolios into net factor income channel inflows and outflows to investigate which of the two sides delivered the largest insurance against income shocks during the recent crisis. We find that the factor income inflow channel proved to be a better shock absorber than the factor income outflow channel during the current financial crisis. In the aftermath of the crisis, interest receipts from debt securities provided a more potent channel of risk-sharing than the receipts on equity holdings. However, the increased risk-sharing through interest receipts itself was a by-product of the financial crisis, because to offset the decline in the receipts of equity holdings, industrial economies increased their debt issuance to stimulate domestic economy.
Results are very similar when consumption risk-sharing is considered. Although FDI holdings did not correspond to noticeable income smoothing, it did support higher consumption smoothing in OECD countries in the run-up to the financial crisis. A decomposition of output shocks revealed that debt assets and equity liability performed better under negative and positive output shocks, respectively. In the new EU countries, the unwinding of capital flows resulted in a sharp fall in income dis-smoothing via the debt liability channel, which appears to be consistent with the switching of their average external balance from deficit to surplus following the intensification of the global financial crisis. Moreover, debt portfolios played a less potent channel of risk-sharing in the new EU countries (than in their EMU counterparts) under negative output shocks. The negative income smoothing via the net compensation of employees channel appears to suggest that the intended benefit of labor migration from new to old EU countries following the EU's enlargement was mostly evaporated by the higher business cycle synchronization of output between these two groups of countries. Risk-sharing is estimated cross-sectionally year-by-year and is smoothed by using a Normal kernel with a bandwidth (standard deviation) equal to 2. 
1/2 whereX t is the period t average of X it across countries and n is the number of countries. Stdev2 (time series) denotes the average across countries of
whereX i is the time average of X it for country i and T is number of the years in the sample. Means and standard deviations are in percentages. A. EMU 1971 EMU -1980 EMU 1981 EMU -1990 EMU 1991 EMU -2000 EMU 2001 EMU -2007 EMU 2001 EMU -2009 ( 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2007 2001-2009 ( (1 − β f ) is the amount of income smoothing via the net factor income flow channel and the coefficient β f is the GLS estimation of the slope in the regression of ∆ log GNI i t on ∆ log GDP i t .
(1 − β + f ) is the amount of income smoothing via the factor income inflow channel where β + f is the GLS estimation of the slope in the regression of ∆ log (GDP + FACTOR INCOME INFLOW) i t on ∆ log GDP i t .
(1 − β − f ) is the amount of income smoothing via the net factor income outflow channel, and the coefficient β − f is the GLS estimation of the slope in the regression of ∆ log (GDP − FACTOR INCOME OUTFLOW) i t on ∆ log GDP i t . 
NET DIVIDEND RECEIPTS
PAYMENTS ON FDI RE.E.
NET REC. ON FDI RE.E. 
10
-5 1 -4 (11) (7) (9)
-3 -3 -7 -2 (12) (7) (11)
NET REC. ON FDI RE.E.
6
-5 -1 -5 (11) (6) (11)
Note: The EMU sample includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. The OECD sample includes the EMU countries plus Canada, Japan, Korea, Norway, Switzerland and the US. 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2009 2001-2007 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2009 2001-2007 ( 
The EMU sample includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. The OECD sample includes the EMU countries plus Canada, Japan, Korea, Norway, Switzerland and the US. Percentages describe the shocks absorbed at each level of smoothing. Standard errors are in parentheses.
(1 − β c ) is the amount of consumption smoothing via factor income flow channel where the coefficient β c is the GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of ∆ log C i t on ∆ log GDP i t .
(1−β + c ) is the amount of consumption smoothing via factor income inflow channel where the coefficient β + c is the GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of ∆ log (C − FACTOR INCOME INFLOW) i t on ∆ log GDP i t .
(1 − β − c ) is the amount of income smoothing via factor income outflow channel where the coefficient β − c is the GLS estimate of the slope in the regression of ∆ log (C − FACTOR INCOME OUTFLOW) i t on ∆ log GDP i t 
